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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MIKE DR ~-\GO~. and ~I ILl\:~\ ~
DR~\.GO~. his wit'P,
Pia iut iff's and Res ponde-Jds,
Case No.
7568

--YS.-

TEDDY G. RrSSELL, and _MANILLA RFSSELL, his wife,
Defendants aud ~-1 ppellants.

1

Brief of Appellants
STATE-'IEKr:e OF FACTS
This is an action in equity in the District Court for
Salt Lake ( 10unty hetwel'll adjoining property owners
to quiet title to contested property between them, to
decree that certain buildings and sewer line construction
by defendants are an unlawful encumbrance and obstruction on plaintiffs' property, to compel defendants and
appellants to remove the alleged building and construction encroachments from the land claimed by plaintiffs
alld respondents, and for damages for the alleged trespass. Defendants filed a counterclaim for an alleged
1
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trespass by plaintiffs and respondents during the period
of defendants' alleged trespass over the contested boundary line and upon the contested property between the
parties. The district court struck out the counterclaim
and awarded judgment and decree to the plaintiffs.
Teddy Russell and his wife, Manilla Russell, who
are defendants and appellants herein, purchased and
took possession of the State rrourist Court at 3114 South
State Street in Salt Lake County, Utah, during the
spring or summer of 1943. Their property was some
65.6 feet more or less in frontage and extended all the
way through the block in an east-west direction from
State Street to Main Street. Mike Dragos and his wife,
plaintiffs and respondents herein, were owners of and
in possession of an adjoining piece of land directly to
the north of the Russell property for the full distanee
westward from State Street of some 495 feet. It is the
common boundary between the Russell and Dragos
properties along this 495 foot strip which is in dispute.
\Vhen the Russells moved onto their property in
1943, a fence was situated between the Russell and
Dragos properties for the full distance of the said 495
feet, marking the line between the properties. (Tr. 60).
rrhis fence began at the sidewalk on State Street and
proceeded westward some 87 feet or more as a wire and
post fence. 'rhe next 37 feet 'vestward were of wire or
wood, and the balance of the fence westward was of
posts, barbed wire and wooden boards. (Tr. 61, 62}. The
rear of the Dragos property westward from State Street
2
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located, or approximately marked, by the west end
post of the fence. (Tr. 163, Def. ~~xh. 12).

wns

It is uncontroverted that the same fence was located
and fixed between the two properties as early as 1911
and 1912 as the boundary line between the properties, and
was so considered by all owners and occupiers of the two
properties until the latter part of 1948 or early in 1949.
(Tr. 63, 82, 139, 140, 147-154, 173, 174). Indeed, there
being no fence or boundary indicator or monument for
165 feet west from State· Street, and the exact boundary
being unlocated and in doubt, at least the east 165 feet of
the fence was extended eastward in 1911 from the older
western section by the owners of both properties, by
mutual agreement to locate and fix the boundary line
between the properties, there being no otherwise fixed
or known boundary, (Tr. 169) and the actual line being
tmcertain. ( Tr. 130, 135, 139, 148, 149). The uncertainty
of the line in 1911 and 1912 is conclusively shown by
the fact that the fence, believed to be established on
the boundary line, was at no place located on the true
survey line, (Def. Exh. 17), (Tr. 51, 52, 62, 98), but
varied or meandered slightly north of due west. (Tr.
63), (Def. Exh. 17). The adjoining owners, by agreement, thereby confirmed and established the entire old
fence line with its eastward extension as the boundary
between the properties which were later to be owned
by appellants and respondents respectively. (Tr .. 134,
135, 137, 138, 139, 148, 149). A joint water well was put.
down on the agreed line as established by the parties,
or very near thereto. (Tr. 134, 135, 161, 162). Both the
3
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fence and the well were constructed by the joint efforts
and upon joint determination of location, by the adjoining landowners at the time, and trees were planted
all along the fence line. These facts are also uncontroverted. err. 6, 25, 69, 134-139, 161).
Substantial portions of the old fence, as established
in 1911 and 1912, remained in place at the time of the
trial o! the cause, ( Tr. 6, 7, 8, 33, 85, 96, 107-111, 120,
131, 136, 145, 146, 151, 152, 154-164, 172, 181, 188--lines
15-27, Tr. 193-194, 197), except for the cinder block
section of some ten feet placed south of the old fence
line and eastward from the east end of the tourist court
cabins by Mike Dragos in 1948 or 1949. (Tr. 32, 86).
Otherwise, its entire original location was marked by
the remaining portions, a remaining tree of tho$e planted
about 1912, old power poles, a well, and other fence
posts. (Tr. 30-lines 27-30; Tr. 31, 32, 34, Def. Exh. 6,
Tr. 37, 64, 65, Def. Exh. 1-16; Tr. 69, 70, 85-96, 107-111,
118, 135, 136, 139, 140, 145, 146, 147, 151, 152, 154, 155,
157, 158, 162, 163, 166, 169, 193, 194, 197). From time
to time boards have been added to the fence and removed from it, and a part of the fence was destroyed
by fire in 1944 or 1945, but was immediately rebuilt at
the same place. ( Tr. 71-7 4). Regardless of all other
markers or monuments, the distance north from the line
of cabins to the old fence line is definitely marked
beyond all doubt by the remaining tree which both
plaintiffs and defendants admit is still in place and was
located along the fence line exactly at the south edge
thereof. (Tr. 6, 23, 71, 89, 90, 109, 147, 156, 157; Def.
4
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Exh. 14, 15). The details of location of the old fence
in 1911 and 1912 and its continuous location in the same
place for more than thirty years and until just before
the trial, are proved by the references given above to
the testimony of the actual residents and owners of
both adjoining pieces of property through every year
from 1911 to 1949. nlany of these witnesses are completely independent persons with no interest in this
action.
From 1911 and 1912 until late in 1944 or 1945, it is
uncontroverted that all property owners on both sides
of the fence used the properties right up to the fence
line on either side of the old fence for their various
proprietary purposes. (Tr. 44, 135, 139, 146, 147, 148,
150, 151, 156, 159; Def. Exh. 16; Tr. 174). There is no
evidence at all that from 1912 until 1944 or 1945 any
boundary other than the old fence was known or considered as far as anyone who testified knew or could
tell. Following 1945, and until the fall of 1948, the evidence is in some conflict on the matter of anyone having
knowledge or any cause to suspect the boundary line
might be other than the old fence line. However, the
plaintiff Mike Dragos testified during the trial that
he too considers the old fence to constitute his boundary
line, ( Tr. 18, 29, 30) .and the conflict is solely found in
the uncorroborated testimony of the two plaintiffs.
In 1928, Edward B. :McCabe and Mary :McCabe, who
then owned the State Tourist Court property, constructed a line of tourist cabins along and against the

5
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old fence. (rrr. 171). There is no record or evidence of
any objection or protest to this by anyone, (Tr. 174),
and the McCabes considered that they effected all of
their construction on their own property. (Tr. 174, 175).
These ('abins were of wood and were built upon concrete
foundations laiJ to within some six to nine inches of
the old fence line as to the north-south sections and
about three feet south of the fence as to the east-west
sections. err. 67, 15:J, 165, 171, 172). A few extra such
foundations were poured by the ~IcCabes on the west
end of their line of original cabins to permit future
construction. ('rr. 175 ). In the process of their original
construction, the .MeCabes extended the back or north
end of the garage portions of their cabins, located between dwelling units, all the way northward to the old
fence itself, and constituted the fence the rear wall of
the garages. (Tr. 108; Def. Exh. 14; rrr. 159, 160, 165,
197). This was done by nailing boards to the old fence
posts (Tr. 173, 176) to make such portions of the fence
the rear wall or panel of the garages. The remainder
of the old , fence back of the cabins and between the
garage sections was also boarded up by the McCabes,
leaving some three feet of space between the backs of
the cabins and the old fence to permit space for cleaning
behind the cabins and to make room for shade trees,
(Tr. 154, 172), and to avoid the nuisance of a cow and
chickens then on the adjoining property to the north.
(Tr. 148, 154, 156.) The McCabes never moved the fence
in any particular, (Tr. 172, 182), nor did the Russells
change its position to the north, or at all. (Tr. 73, 74,
7:J, 120, 154, 155, 194).
6
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rrhe Russells thereafter pulled most of the originally
planted tret.)s situated along the south ed~e of the old
fence, but left one tree in plnn', ( rrr. 69, 70, 71; De f.
Exh. 7, 15 ), and separatdy and by units, renovated the
cabins, completing some in cintlt.>r block and concrete
(Tr. 66}, but limiting this construction to the location
of ~IcCabe 's concrete foundations laid in 1928 south of
the old fence line. (Tr. 67, 68, 108, 109; Def. Exh. 14;
Tr. 126, 128). The Russells installed some of the wooden
cabins on the old concrete foundations at the west end
of :McCabes' completed cabins. (Tr. 66, 67, 89-91, 95;
Def. Exh. 8, 11, 15). Various units were completed from
time to time until August of 1948, when the last unit to
be renovated was completed. The five on the east end
were completed by ~lay of 1946. (Tr. 68, 69). As the
various units were completed, the Russells installed a
permanent tile and metal sewer line along the north edge
of the line of cabins. (Def. Exh. 10, Tr. 93-95, Tr. 68).
All construction was at least six to eight inches south
of the old fence line, which the Russells, in good· faith,
continued to consider the boundary line between the
parties. (Tr. 15, 47, 82, 83, 114, 124, 125, 126, 127). It is
uncontroverted that extensive al'ld costly construction
work involving expense to the Russells of many thousands of dollars was completed by way of renovation of
these cabin·s and installation of a sewer of a permanent
nature, (Tr. 66, 110, Defs. Exh. 1-15) all with full
knowledge of the respondents herein, (Tr. 14-15) and
the only important conflict in the evidence arises upon
the point as to whether or not the respondents made
any protest to appellants or had any idea the boundary

7
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line might he other than the fence line, during the
entire period of construction by the Russells. (Tr. 63).
However, the evidence would seem overwhelming that
the respondents always considered the old fence the
actual boundary line between themselves and the Russells. err. 18, 29) and did not object to the location of
the fence and the construction by the defendants. (Tr.
2H, Lines 8-25; rrr. 190-191). The respondent, Mike
Dragos, testified that when Russell removed part of the
boards and some posts during renovation construction
of the cabins, he re-installed the fence at the special
request of Dragos, to which Dragos never did object
(rrr. 190-191) until 1949 after the survey was made and
trouble developed between the parties. (Tr. 191). The
respondents considered that even the sewer line along
the north side of the renovated cabins was south of the
established boundary line, and }fike Dragos so admits.
(Tr. 34, 35, 36, Def. Exh. 3).
While the Dragos testimony is that they considered
the Russells to be clearly encroaching upon their property for the entire period of time since renovation of
these costly and permanent buildings began, that is, for
several years, (Tr. 14, 15) and so informed the Russells
and demanded that they moYe back, yet they actually
did absolutely nothing during this several year period
to protect their property against the alleged known
encroachment, and it is a fact, admitted by the plaintiff
:Mike Dragos, that in August and September of 1948, as
the sewer line became completed, :Mike Dragos bargained
for and arranged with Teddy Russell that if Russell

8
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would permit him to eoiuwet hi~ ~l·ptie tank to RnssPll 's
would pay
Sewer ' DraO'os
~
. Hnssl)ll tht• sum of $~5.00 e<lSh
for the right to eonneet and would pay Russl•ll 's mnu to
make the eonneetion. Thi8 was aeeomplished in good
friendship and the money paid to Russell hy .Mik(\
Dragos in the Russell home OYL'l' a glass of beer el,r. 35,
36, 79, 80) about Christmas time, three months after
the connection 'vas made. During none of these negotiations did respondents object or demand defendants to
move any of their construction. There is no conflict on
this vital point, nor is it otherwise explained. It is also
the uncontroverted evidence that following the initial
connection, ~like Dragos in 1949 again approached Teddy
Russell to ask permission to connect the Dragos Tavern
lavatories to the Russell sewer line, and Dragos agreed
to pay a further $25.00 for the right to connect, but due
solely to difficulties of proper drainage Dragos did not
ultimately make the connection. (Tr. 80, 81). The parties were still, at the time of this second agreement,
apparently good friends, (Tr. 75) and Russell regularly
patronized the Dragos Tavern. (Tr. 81). This tavern,
built by Dragos in 1948 by the same contractor who had
worked on the Russells' cabins along the fence in the
beginning of the renovation, was so constructed that its
walls somewhat parallelled the old fence line and in so
doing, wandered considerably to ·the north of the later
determined east-west survey line. The uncontroverted
testimony is that the tavern was purposely so built to
stay in line with the old fence. (Def. Exh. 2, 3; Tr. 35,
111-112).
9
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Appellants' evidence is all to the effect that the
first objection made by the respondents to Russells concerning any claim that Russells were encroaching upon
the Dragos property came in April of 1949. ( Tr. 75, 76,
77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82). Russell had experienced his ~rst
difficulty with :-..1 ike Dragos l'arlier in the spring of 1949
when he complained to Dragos that customers of the
Dragos tavern enterprise were continually blocking up
one of Russell's driveways into his property. The fact
of this difficulty is uncontroverted. (Tr. 76, 81). About
this same time the respondents decided to sell their
property, and for the first time had it surveyed. (Tr. 52,
53). The Dragos survey, made according to the Dragos
deed, occurred in April of 1949 (Tr. 16), and disclosed
that while the fence was located very near to the survey
line between the properties at the State Street end of
the fence, a very gradual and slight difference developed
as the fence proceeded westerly-such that the west end
of the fence lay about 2.7 feet north of the survey line.
The survey also showed that the cabins renovated of
cinder block, while wholly and completely south of the
old fence line, meandered slightly north as they proceeded westward approximately parallel with the old
fence, from a position just south of the survey line at
the east end of the cinder block cabins to about 2.1 feet
north of the survey line at the west end of the cinder
block cabins. (Def. Exh. 17). The width of the sewer line
was 6 inches, immediately north of the cabins. The
balance of the cabins westward all appear to be not
only south of the fence but a]so south of the survey line,
except for old garage sections going to the fence. (Def.
10
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Exh. 17). Following the Drago~ ~urn•y aud tlw filing- of
this complaint, Husst..•ll eausPd a ~nrn•y to ht> made of his
north line, which the pa rtiPs agTt..'l'd, is virtually identical with the Dragos survey, and a chart and certificate
of surYey showing t1rtails of the old fence line and the
cabins to the southward, all drawn to scale, have been
receiYed in eYidence as one of the exhibits for the appellants. ( Def. Exh. 17).
In 1948 after all renovation and construction was
complete, Russell had some question about his south
line and had it surveyed. (Tr. 110-111). He was not at
that time in any way concerned about his north line and
there is no evidence that he was aware at that time of
any discrepency with his north line. (Tr. 123, 125-126,
165).
All the evidence, except for the unsubstantiated
testimony of the respondents, show·s that none of Russell's renovation and sewer construction proceeded north
of the old McCabe foundations or within inches of the
old fence line. The Russells proceeded entirely in good
faith (Tr. 15, 47, 48, 124, 127) and at great cost to themselves. The Dragos stood by and did absolutely nothing
during the entire period of construction, a period of
about five years and according to some of the evidence,
seven years, except to approve and recognize the full
propriety of even the sewer location, the northernmost
part of the work done by the Russells. The weight of
the evidence shows that it was not until trouble developed
over the respondents' tavern operation and respondents

11
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contemplated ~clling their land that either respondents
or appellants or any of their predecessors in title back
to 1912 had any idea that a survey line might be located
differently from the fence line, which since 1912 at least,
had been the established and res.pected boundary line
between the properties (Tr. 18).
Actual measurement of the width of the Dragos
property at its west end and northward from the west
end of the old fence to the west end of the fence on the
north side of the Dra.gos land is not only the full 66
feet claimed by the respondents but 671;2 feet. (Tr. 83,
84, 85. Def. Exh. 12). The respondents thus not only
now claim their north fence as their boundary line but
claim an additional 2.7 feet south of the old fence at its
west end and thereby giving them not 66 but 70.2 feet
in width of property at their west end. (Tr. 23, 24, 54).
The respondents state that all they claim is 66 feet of
land at the east end and also the west end of their property. (Tr. 23, 24, 25, 54). They further claim only 66
feet south from their north fence line which they claim
is correctly positioned. (Tr. 37, 40). :Mike Dra.gos and
Milka Dragos then testified that their only claim against
the Russells 'vas on account of construction work north
of the old fence line (Tr. 27, 30, 31, 52), and Milka
Dragos claims one cannot now even tell where the old
fence was located. (Tr. 49, 52). The respondent, Mike
Dragos, also claims he owns the well drilled jointly on
or near the old fence line in 1911. (Tr. 32, Def. Exh. 3,
6). Notwithstanding the testimony of respondents that
the old fence did not reach northward to the power
12
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poles, and permitted them to pas~ between the fem•t•
and the poles, the uncontradieted testimony i~ t ha 1 rl'spondents in building their own fence, stopped short of
one of tht> power poles to permit passage north of the
pole through a gate: (Tr. 191, 192-3) and further one
of the occupants of the Russell property in 1911 testified the old fence was '•right next to t h0 pole'' and "was
up against it·' and had not been changed when she
moved away in 1~28. (Tr. 92-3, 131, 136, 140). It is
appa1·ent that plaintiffs are not at all clear as to what
they should claim and just how they are injured.
During the first few months of 1949, the plaintiffs
and respondents removed and changed a portion of the
old fence running eastward from the tourist cabins to
a point and line south of the former location of the
fence and then piled on the land thus gained, quantities
of brick, blocks and other material, thereby encroaching
and trespassing upon land of appellants. Appellants'
counterclaim for this cause of action was stricken by
the Court upon motion of respondents.
Following entry of the judgment herein, defendants
filed their motion for a new trial which the court by its
subsequent order denied in toto. The motion was based
upon:
(l) newly discovered evidence which though material
was not capable of discovery through any exercise of
reasonable diligence during the trial of the cause and
to the effert that the power poles along the fence line
13
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and in place at the time of the trial were in fact
originally placed along the old fence line more than
30 years prior to the filing of the complaint, and
further that the original poles had been replaced in
the same place occupied by the original poles ten
to fifteen years before the filing of the complaint;
and
(2) that the judgment and the decree were against the
evidence and the law.
srrATEJ\fENT OF POINTS
1. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

2. The Court erred 1n granting plaintiffs' motion
to strike both counterclaims No. 1 and No. 2 from defendants' answer and counterclaim.
3. The evidence is insufficient to support the findings of the Court and the findings are contrary to the
evidence as follows :

a. As specified in paragraph No. 1 of the findings that ''During all times herein mentioned
and prior to commencement of this action
plaintiffs ha1Te been ... in possession of the
following described real property ... ''
b. As specified in paragraph ~ o. 3 of the findings
that ''On or about the month of October, 1943,
the defendants began the construction of a
motel and began to erect on the north part of
their lot a number of cabins."

14
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c. ..:-\~ sperified in paragraph Ko. -l- of tlw finding~

that '• said rabins and :::.L~wer pipe linP \\'ere
eonstrnded oYer into p1nintiff::4' l:nl(l notwithstanding the prote~ts of plaintiffs and ngnin~t
their ronsent ~ that prior to the ron1meurement
of thi.~ artion plaintiffs have made demands
upon the defendants to remoYe said buildings
and sPwer line from their premises but although defendants han_• made many promises
to do ~o. they have refused and neglected to
take do-wn and remove the same or any part
thereof.''
d. ..:-\s specified in paragraph No. 5 thereof:
''That the said described land of the plaintiffs is of great value ... and plaintiffs are
prevented from using and occupying the whole
of their land f~r such purpose by reason of
the intrusion of the buildings and sewer line
erected by the defendants and that plaintiffs'
land is greatly diminished and the same is
made unsalable and the plaintiffs are greatly
damaged.
e. ) .. s specified in paragraph X o. 7 thereof: "that
said fence was located on the legal boundary
line separating said two parcels of land belonging to the plaintiffs and the defendants.''
f. The findings and particularly paragraph No. 7
thereof fail to sett]e the issue of fact as to
whether or not the fence line between the
parties as existing for more than thirty years
by way of the legal boundary was located on
the slnTey line between the parties according
to the deed descriptions of the parties or to
the northward thereof and whether or not defendants ever encroached over and northwan1
of said fence line.
g. Paragraph Xo. 8 of the findings and each and

every fincling therein.
15
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4. That the findings and conclusions are inconsistent
or ambiguous and are insufficient to sustain the judgment and decree herein.
5. rrhat the Court erred in not finding upon the
issue and thereafter concluding as a matter of law that
as to all construetion of defendants north of the deed
survey line between the parties, or at least as to all
separate construction done or eompleted prior to 6 May,
1946, one or more of the statutes of limitation were a
bar to action thereupon by the plaintiffs.
6. The Court should have granted appellants' motion for a new trial.
7. The findings, conclusions and decree are insufficient, in error and against the law in finding, concluding and decreeing that under the evidence and the law
the plaintiffs and respondents are entitled to the possession of all the land described in paragraph No. 1 of
the complaint and that a mandatory injunction should
issue requiring the defendants and appellants to remove
all construction in any way located on such described
land rather than to determine and then require defendants to pay to plaintiffs the value of any land encroached upon.

16
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AHGU ~lEN'l'
l.

DOES THE COl\IPLAINT FAIL rro STATE
A CLAil\l UPOX 'VHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED?
Part of the Complaint in plain terms and language
avers that plaintitrs have been at all times mentioned in
said complaint and ••prior to commencement of this
action'' and now are the owners and in possession of all
the land claimed by plaintiffs. Based on Par. 1 of their
complaint, plaintiffs have no grievance or cause for
''ction against defendants. The paragraph is essential
to the complaint because it describes all of the property
claimed by plaintiffs in the complaint and sets forth the
necessary allegations of ownership and possession to
comply with Sections 104-2-5 and 6 U.C.A. 1943.
The allegations in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the
complaint are in conflict and do not cure the defect.
Further, it is not clear from paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of
the complaint whether the same lot referred to in Par. 1
of the complaint or some other lot of the plaintiffs is
being encroached upon by defendants.

17
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II.

DID rrHE UOURT ERR lX GRA~TING PLAINrriFFS' :\IOrriON TO STRll{E BOTH COUNTERCLAI11S ~<>. 1 A~D ~0. 2 FROM DEFENDANTS'
ANSWER A:\']) COUNTERCLAJM ~
Counterclaim X o. 1 (page 4 of defendants' answer
and counterclaim) is a cause of action for a counter
trespass occurring during the same period plaintiffs
complain of (lefendants' trespass and encroachment and
arising over the same contested boundary line situation
and depends for its determination on the same essential
issue as to whether the legal boundary line between the
parties is to be located on the old fence line or whether
on the survey line delineating the deed description of
the properties of the parties. This counterclaim arises
.out of the identical boundary line dispute and the issues
to be determined are almost identical. It would seem
clear that the counterclaim is definitely within the pur.
view of Sec. 104-9-2(1) UCA. 1943 and Rules 13(a) and
13(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring
that the counterclaim arise out of the transaction set
forth in the complaint or be connected with the subject
of the action and particularly is within Rule 13 (b) providing for permissive counterclaims not arising out of
the transaction or subject matter of the action stated in
the complaint. It is true that the rules of civil procedure
were not effective until January of 1950 and that the
order striking counterclaim No. 1 was made in July of
1949. Ho,vever, in view of the intent of the rules that

18
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the widest latitude exi8t to permit filing of n couHtPr··
claim, and this entire action hndng been treated as an
equity action and the appellate court haYing the power
to review the entire record, (Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah
57, 2'76 P. 912, 69 .A.L.R. 1-:l-17), it would appear that
the court should permit defendants' counterclaim No. 1
to be tried in this action upon the occasion of any
remittitur for the taking of new or additional evidence.
III.
IS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FIKDINGS OF THE COURT AND ARE
THE FINDINGS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE:

a. As specified in Par. 1 of the findings that "During all times herein mentioned and prior to commencement of this action plaintiffs have been in possession of
the following described real property . . . '' ~ Plaintiffs'
complaint in paragraphs No. 3, 4 and 5 alleges that in
fact defendants took wrongful possession of plaintiffs'
property by building over onto plaintiffs' property and
staying there, thereby preventing use and occupation
not only of the area of encroachment but of the whole
of the plaintiffs' land. If the plaintiffs during all times
mentioned in the complaint were in fact in possession
of all of their land, then plaintiffs have nothing to
complain of. The plaintiffs complain (paragraphs 3, 4
and 5 of the complaint) that plaintiffs were in fact not
in possession of all of their land as claimed in Par. 1 of
the complaint since the first day any construction of
the defendants was made o\·er the line delineating the
19
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property therein described. (Plaintiffs' Exh. A, Tr. 17,
51). rrhe evidence shows that plaintiffs and their predecessors since 1912 were never in possession of any
land south of the old fence line between the parties and
that the fence line was located for virtually all of its
distance somewhat to the north of the south line of the
description in plaintiffs' deed (Pis. Exh. 1, Tr. 44, 63,
82, 135, 139, 140, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 154, 156, 159,
173, 174, Defs. Exhibits 16 and 17). It is admitted, however, that plaintiffs were in possession of the great
majority of the property called for by their deed. (Tr.
24, 25, Def. Exh. 6, Tr. 33).
b. As specified in paragraph No. 3 of the findings
that "On or about the month of October, 1943, the defendants began the construction of a motel and began
to erect on the north part of their lot a number of
cabins''~ The evidence is conclusive on the part of
both plaintiffs and defendants and from other witnesses
that cabins existed on property of the defendants and
along the disputed boundary line since 1928 and that
defendants began renovation or remodeling in 1943.
There is no evidence whatsoever that in 1943 defendants
''began the construction of a motel'' and ''began to
erect . . . a number of cabins." The evidence is, of
course, that the motel and cabins had clearly been in
existence for fifteen years when defendants began renovation in 1943. and for more than twenty years when
plaintiffs filed their complaint in 1949. (Tr. 12, 44-45,
63, 66-67, 68, 171, 180).
20
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c. As specified in Par. 4 of the findings that "Haid
cahi ns and sewer pipe line were l'onstructed ovPr into
plaintiffs' land notwithstanding the protestH of plaintiffs and against their consent; that prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiffs have made demands
upon the defendants to remove said buildings and sewer
line from their premises, but although defendants have
made many promisl'S to do so, they have refused and
neglected to take down and remove the same or any part
thereof"¥ The record contains no reference whatsoever
to any promises of the defendants to remove and take
down any eonstruction at all or any construction alleged
by plaintiffs to be an encroachment upon their property,
nor does the record eontain any faets indicating an admission, express or implied, that defendants or either
of them knew they were building over onto plaintiffs'
land or even north of the old fenee to any extent at all.
Instead and aside from the uneorroborated and contradietory testimony of Mike Dragos and his wife (Tr. 14lines 18-21, Tr. 190-lines 24-30 and 191-lines 1-7, Tr.
35-36, Tr. 49-lines 1-12, Tr. 52-lines 25-30 and Tr.
53-lines 1-7, Tr. 53) the evidence is eonsistently dear
that all eonstruetion by defendants was done under
claim of right, without protest on the part of the plaintiffs, was with plaintiffs tacit, if not express eonsent,
acquieseence and approval, was open and notorious, was
reeognized by the plaintiffs themselves as rightfully
done by the defendants and when eompleted, was the
property of the defendants to the extent of the northernmost part of any eonstruction done by the defendants,
the sewer line. It further is the uneontradieted fact
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that the respective properties were used right up to
the old fence line on both sides by the respective owners
and occupants while considering the fence the property
line for 32 years before defendants began any construction and for 38 years before plaintiffs filed their
complaint. It would further appear conclusive that no
renovation or construction was effected by the defendants north of the old fence line.
d. As specified in Par. 5 thereof ''That the said
described land of the plaintiffs is of great value ... and
plaintiffs are prevented from using and occupying the
whole of their land for such purpose by reason of the
intrusion of the buildings and sewer line erected by the
defendants and that plaintiffs' land is greatly diminished
and the same is made unsalable and the plaintiffs are
greatly damaged . . . "'? The record is entirely devoid
of any evidence that plaintiffs' land is of great value,
is situated in any business district, is suitable for business purposes and plaintiffs are prevented from using

and occupying the \Vhole of their land or more than an
unnoticeable and minute part of it due to any construction by defendants, that plaintiffs' land is greatly
diminished or to any extent more than such almost imperceptible and unused portion along the south boundary
of their lot, that the same was made unsalable or that
plaintiffs were greatly damaged or at all (Def. Exhibits
1-17).

e. As specified in Par. 7 thereof '' . . . that said
fence was located on the legal boundary line separating
22
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said two parcels of land belonging to the plaintiffs and
the defendants"? It is impossible to know from snell
finding \Yhether tlw · •lt:gal boundary'' 1nentioned is the
line called for by the deed of the plaintiffs or the line of
the old fence Yery slightly north of the deed line, and
which the defendants contend, under the facts, became
the legal boundary for the purposes of this action. If
the finding is meant to locate the old fence right along
the deed line, then the evidence in this case is almost
conclusive that the old fence going westward, meandered
to the north and was located for most of its distance
slightly north of the deed line and did not at any point
coincide with the deed line. (Def. Exhibits 17 and 18,
Tr. 98-104, Def. Exhibits 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14 and
15, Tr. 85, 86, 87-89 incl., Tr. 25-lines 13-25, Tr. 69lines 8-30 and Tr. 70-line 1, Tr. 71-75 incl., Tr. 62-65
incl., Tr. 67-68, Tr. 106-lines 8-9, Tr. 117, 90-91, 89-90,
91-92, 92-93, 93-95, 95-96, 107-108).

f. The findings nowhere and particularly in Par. 7
thereof determine and settle the issue of fact as to
whether or not the fence line between the parties as
existing for more than thirty years as the legal boundary
was located on the survey line between the parties according to the deed descriptions of the parties or to
the northward thereof and whether or not defendants
ever encroached over and northward of said fence line.
·Defendants' affirmative defenses 6(b) and 6(d) (Par. 2
of the answer and counterclaim) allege the fence line
"·as the boundary line between the parties and in defense 6(e) (Par. 2 of the answer and counterclaim) that
23
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the entire construction of defendants was south of the
fence line. These allegations raised the issue of fact
of the location of the fence line as compared to any different boundary line called for by the deeds of the
partieH and required a finding and also a conclusion of
law as to whether the fence was located apart from the
deed line and if so was it the legal boundary between
the parties for the purpose of this action. If the fence
was north of the deed line and was the legal boundary,
then the issue of whether defendants effected any construction north of the fence remained. It is elementary
that a finding must be made on each material issue of
fact raised by the pleadings and a conclusion of law
determined on each material issue of law raised by the
pleadings and the facts as found. (2 Bancroft's Code
Practice and Remedies 2157-par. 1677, page 2158-Par.
1679, page 2159-par. 1680, page 2170-par. 1690, page
2172-par. 1692, page 2175-par. 1695 et seq.)
g. As specified in Par. 8 of the findings that "The

court finds the issues in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants and further finds that the affirmative issues raised in defendants' answer are not supported by the evidence and the court finds on said defenses in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants''~

( 1) As to defense 6 (a)
counterclaim) the evidence
fendants simply renovated
the identical foundations of

(page 2 of the answer and
is uncontradicted that deor remodeled cabins upon
earlier cabins laid down in
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1~}~8. did not eonst.ruet northward of sue.h foundations

and all eon~t ruction, ineluding tht) sewer on the north
was in all eases south of the old fence line. (Tr. 67, 68,
108,109, 15, 47, 82, 83, 124, 126, 12i, Def. Exhibits 1-17).
(::!) As to the defense 6(b) (page 2 of the answer

and counterclaim), the eourt 's finding No. 7 is direetly
in aceord with the matters alleged therein and the evidence i~ overwhelming and clear in support thereof,
throughout the transcript.
(3) As to the defense 6( e) (page 2 of the answer
and counterclaim) the plaintiffs admit the truth thereof
and the testimony for the defendants is eonsistently in
support thereof (Tr. 44, 63, 82, 135, 139, 140, 146, 147,
148, 150, 151, 154, 156, 159, Def. Exhibits 16 and 17, Tr.
174). The oceupant of the Russell property in 1911
testified that in 1911 the respective owners of the adjoining properties in question settled the doubtful
boundary line situation between them by establishing a
new fence as an extension of the older fence line and
constituting the fence as the aetual boundary line between the parties. No other boundary line ever appears
to have been definitely known, (Tr. 139-140), until 1949.
(Tr. 16, 52, 53, Def. Exh. 17).

·)-
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IV.
ARE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
INCONSISrrENT OR AMBIGUOUS AND INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE'

a. Par. 1 of the findings stating that plaintiffs at
all times were in possession of all land described in
their deed is directly controverted by paragraphs 3, 4,
5 and 6 of the findings which in substance state that
defendants were encroaching upon and were actually
in possession of part of such land to the extent of their
construction north of the south boundary of the plaintiffs' described land. The uncontradicted evidence is
that the plaintiffs had more land even between their
north fence and the old fence line between the parties
to this action than plaintiffs' deed called for (Tr. 83, 84,
85, Defs. Exhibit 12) and plaintiffs claimed every bit
of such ground as being the ground called for by their
deed (Tr. 23, 24, 54). It is thus clear that if finding No.1
stands, in view of the evidence as to the extent of land
possessed and claimed by plaintiffs north of the old
fence behveen the parties, findings No.3, 4, 5 and 6 must
fall as well as the decree.

v.
DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT FINDING
UPON THE ISSUE AND THEREAFTER CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT AS TO
ALL CONSTRUCTIOX OF DEFENDANTS i\ORTH

26
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OF 1,HE DEED SURVEY LINE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES, OR ~-\.T LEAST AS TO ALL SEPARATE
COXSTRrCTION DONE OR C'Ol\TPLETED PRIOR
TO 6 ~lAY, 1946, OXE OR ~IORg OF THE STATUTES OF LL\IITATION \VEHE A BAH TO ACTIOX THER.El~PO~ BY THE PLAINTIFFS 1

r_

:c

~;

The evidence is uncontradicted that the property on
the south side of the old fence was used for cabin purposes right up to the old fence since 1928 ( T:r:. 67, 155,
165, 171-174, 66, 110). The defendants, according to
the overwhelming evidence did not effect any construction north of the old fence line (Tr. 67, 68, 108, 109,
126, 128, 66, 89-91, 95, 15, 47, 82, 83, 124, 127, Defs. Exhibits 1-17) and the old fence line remained at the date
of the trial substantially where it had always been (Tr.
6-8, 33, 85, 96, 107-111, 120, 131, 136, 145, 146, 151, 152,
154-164, 172, 181, 18~lines 15-27, 193-194, 197). The
evidence is again virtually unanimous that the fence
was considered the boundary between the parties and so
respected by the adjoining owners and their predecessors in title since about 1911 or 1912 and it was recognized that the respective owners were enttiled to the
land on each side of the fence right up to the fence (Tr.
44, 63, 82, 135, 139, 140, 146-154, 156, 159, 173, 174, Defs.
Exhibits 1-17). Indeed, there can be no doubt but that
the owners on each side of the fence were in open,
notorious and exclusive possession of the land under
full claim of right all the way to the old fence line. It
follows that defendants and their continuous chain of
predecessors in title since 1911 were in possession of
27
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all of the land south of the old fence line. Plaintiffs or
their predecessors were not and could not have been in
possession of any land south of the old fence and were
therefore not seised of or in possession of any of the
land south of the old fence line since at least 1912. Plain- ·
tiffs are therefore barred in this action for the recovery
of their property or the possession thereof by the direct
provisions of Sections 104-2-5 and 6, U.C.A. 1943 as
follows:
Sec. 104-2-5 : No action for the recovery of real
property or for the possession thereof shall be
maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff,
his ancestor, grantor or predecessor was seised
or possessed of the property in question within
seven years before commencement of the action ...
Sec. 104-2-6: No cause of action, or defense or
counterclaim to an action, founded upon the title
to real property or to rents or profits out of the
same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that
the person prosecuting the action, or interposing
the defense or counterclaim, or under whose title
the action is prosecuted, or defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or
grantor of such person was seised or possessed
of the property in question within seven years
before the eommitting of the act in respect to
which such action is prosecuted or defense or
counterclaim made ...
These sections were added to as regards tax titles by
the 1943 session laws but were not changed as to any
of the provisions cited.
Bozievich v. Slechta, et al., 109 Utah 373, 166 P.
2d 239.
28
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~d
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Y.

~d

Con~t Land Co., :2~) Cal.

301.

Since thi~ action is, in addition to being one based
on title to land and for the recovery of possession of
the same, also one for trespass upon and injury to real
property, it seems dear that Sec. 104-2-24 U.C.A. 1943
would further bar relief to the plaintiffs for any construction on the part of defendants completed prior to
6 May, 1946. The section requires commencement of
an action within three years upon '' (1) An action for
waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; ... ''
The evidence shows that the easternmost six cabins
of the line of cabins alleged to be encroaching on plaintiffs' land, were finished as a separate series of renovation of cabins by the summer of 1946 ( Tr. 68-69), and
the east five of these were of cinder block and finished
first (Tr. 66). It would thus appear that a considerable
portion, if not all of the construction and renovation of
at least the five eastern cabins were completed by 6 May
1946, three years prior to filing of this action, including
foundations, floors, walls and sewer connection. This
construction was obviously open and notorious and plaintiffs admit they were aware of it from the beginning
(Tr. 13, 14, 15, 47). It is submitted that as to the con~truction completed prior to 6 ~fay, 1946, plaintiffs are
limited at the most to the value of any land which it
might be determined defendants encroached upon with
their renovation. (See Salt Lake Investment Co. v.
Railroad, 46 Utah 203, 148 P. 439).
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VI. and VII.
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GRANT APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW
'rRIAL and
ARE 'rHE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
DECREE INSUFFICIENT, IN ERROR AND
AGAINST THE LAW IN FINDING, CONCLUDING
AND DECREEING THAT UNDER THE EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW THE PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF ALL THE LAND DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH NO. 1 OF THE COMPLAINT AND THAT
A MANDATORY INJUNCTION SHOULD ISSUE
REQUIRING DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS
TO REMOVE ALL CONSTRUCTION IN ANY WAY
LOCATED ON SUCH DESCRIBED LANDT
Defendants' motion for a new trial rested first on
newly discovered evidence tending to prove that the old
fence between the parties was located well to the northward of any construction by defendants and that the
location of the old fence for more than thirty years
prior to the filing of the complaint could not be in doubt
under the new evidence. Specifically, the new evidence
would show that power poles, located and referred to
by testimony and the exhibits in the case (Tr. 63, 65,
72, 191-193, 92-93, 107, 108, 131, 136, 140, 194, Defs. Exhibits 7, 10, 9, 4, 17), were in existence and located in
the same place as shown in the exhibits for more than
30
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thirty years prior to filing of t ht> complaint and were
simply replaced by the present poles within ten to
fifteen years just prior to the complaint. This evidence
would further directly refute the testimony of the
plaintiff, Mike Dragos, that the poles were installed as
late as 1936 (Tr. 189). Such evidence is material on
the issue of the actual location of the old fence and as
to whether defendants could possibly have effected any
of their construction northward of the old fence line.
It should be recalled that the eourt found that the old
fence existed for more than thirty years prior to the
complaint upon the boundary line between the parties
(Par. 7 of the Findings of Fact).
The second ground of the motion for a new trial was
that the judgment and deeree was against the evidence
and the law. Appellants' point VII may be here argued
as part of the same general problem. Defendants submit
that the entire transcript, taken in connection with the
exhibits in the case show by consistent evidenee from
defendants and many independent witnesses, and by
conflicting testimony from the plaintiffs the conclusive
and over,vhelming preponderance of the evidenee that
the defendants renovated cabins beginning in 1943; finished at least five of them in May of 1946; effeeted the
construction entirely upon space oecupied by eabins
since 1928 and upon foundations thereof and did not
construct anything north of the old fence line which
existed in plaee and along a line marked by an old
cedar post at its west end (Tr. 188-lines 15-27, 152,
193-197 incl., Defendants' Exhibits 5, 12 and 17), a
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remaining tree planted about 1912 or earlier (Tr. 69-70,
90, 135, 147, 156-157, 169), the power poles (Tr. 30, 61,
64, 65, 72, 73, 74, 92, 94, 136, 140, 158, 193, 194, 197),
the well (rrr. 61, 87, 134, 135, 146, 161, 173), and the
concrete foundations originally poured by the McCabes
(67, 90, 95, 155, 172, Defs. Exhibit 8) extending to
within about six inches of the old fence (note that these
are all relatively permanent monuments); that the .said
fence was acquiesced in as to position and location and
was considered and respected as the boundary line between the respective parties for more than thirty years
next preceding filing of the complaint; that construction was very costly to defendants, was of a relatively
permanent nature and was completed without objection
by plaintiffs and with their approval and recognition of
its propriety and validity until the fall of 1948 or the
spring of 1949 ; the work was done under full claim of
right and was ·open, notorious and known to plaintiffs
from the beginning; the encroachment over the deed
survey line is very small indeed, is of minute comparative damage to plaintiffs and plaintiffs do not appear
to have any new or different use for the land alleged
encroached upon than they had for it prior to 1949 when
they acquiesced in the position of the old fence line and
prior to 1943 when admittedly there was universal
acquiescence in the position of the old fence and defendants had not begun any construction. The exhibits
show no interference by the construction of defendants
with any activity or structures of the plaintiffs. The
encroachment, if any, has resulted in plaintiffs and their
predecessors in title being out of possession of the small
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portion of land encroached upon since 1911 and ch·arly
~iiH'L' 19~~ when the same use of the land l'IH'roaehed
upon was instituted in favor of defendants' predecessor
in title as was to continue thereaftt>r through 1943 to
1949 under the defendants.
If it be admitted for the purpose of this argument
that defendants haYe effected eostly and expensive con~truction of a permanent nature upon land of the plaintiffs, to a slight extent, and plaintiffs are not for any
other reason without a right or remedy, then it would
appear that in this situation the court should not require
defendants to remove the construction. Rather, in view
of the peeuliar facts, plaintiffs are in equity to be denied
a mandatory injunction and rightly limited to a recovery
of the ·value of the land encroached upon. The rule is
well stated in 1 Am. Jur. 516 et seq., par. 19 as follows:
"While the right to a mandatory injunction under
proper circumstances is firmly established, the
injunction may be refused because of the absence
of proper circumstances, or especially because
of inequitable incidents ... The same exception
(denial of the injunction and awarding damages
to cover the value of the portion of land occupied
by the encroachment) is made in favor of a bona
fide trespasser where his damage, if compelled to
remove the encroachment would be greatly disproportionate to the injury of which the plaintiff
complains by reason of the encroachment, for the
general rule is that the extraordinary remedy of
injunction is allowable only when strong reasons
therefore are shown.''
This doctrine is certainly not new. In 1888, in the case
of Hunter v. Carroll, 64 N.H. 572, 15 Atl. 17, 14 A.L.R.
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836, the court refused to order the removal of a building
which encroached. at one point 7.45 feet, and another
building which encroached 4.95 feet, upon land of the
complainant, where the complainant might apparently
be fully compensated and the land itself recovered in
proceedings at law; but, if not, it was held that equity
would not aid in the attempt since the injury to 'the
complainant was very small and could be compensated
and the defendant would be subjected to great inconvenience and expense in removing the buildings which
were erected innocently and with no intent to trespass
upon the complainant's land.
To the same effect are Delorme v. Cusson (1897)
28 Can. S.C. 66 and Goldbacher v. Eggers (1902) 38
Misc. 36, 76 N.Y. Supp. 881, affirmed 1903, 82 App. Div.
637, 84 N.Y. Supp. 1127 and affirmed in 1904 17~ N.Y.
551, 71 N .E. 1131. Other and later cases to the same
effect are collected in 14 A.L.R. at page 835 et seq., 31
A.L.R. 1302 and 96 A.L.R. 1291 et seq.
Of course, each case must rest on its own circumstances. (Glinn v. Silver (1916) 64 Pa. Super. Ct. 383,
96 A.L.R. 1291), and in this case it would appear that
all the equities are with the defendants and appellants.
They accomplished all building under claim of right (Tr.
15, 47, 48, 82, 83, 114, 124, 125, 126, 127) and at the most
were guilty of mutual error with plaintiffs and plaintiffs'
predecessors in title and occupancy as to the location
of the true boundary. Their construction is extremely
expensive and difficult to remove and the damage, if
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any, to plaintiffs is extremely small, and although the
plaintiff~ liYed within a few f(\et of all construction
complained of from 1943 through 1948, they took no
steps to stop construction, or if in doubt as to the line,
even make a survey. The final and convincing act of
the plaintiffs and respondents came in 1948 after all
construction had been completed and Mike Dragos bargained for and paid defendants for the right to connect
their cesspool to defendants' sewer line, the part of
defendants' construction of greatest alleged encroach·
ment, under circumstances indicating plaintiffs were
entirely pleased with the arrangement and the construction situation. Thus while the evidence is in direct conflict, to the extent of the uncorroborated testimony of
the two plaintiffs, as to whether any objection at all
was ever made by plaintiffs to any of the construction
for any reason, the great, conclusive weight of the evidence would appear to require the finding that no protest was in fact made until the fall of 1948 or the spring
of 1949.
In support of the position of defendants and appel]ants with respect to the old fence line having become
the legal boundary between themselves and plaintiffs
and respondents, the attention of the Court is directed
to the leading case of Davis vs. Lynha1n, 67 Utah 283,
247 Pac. 294. In that case the facts were remarkably
similar to the facts in this case. The Court quotes the
findings of the Lower Court in its opinion as the facts
in the case as follows:
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"that said boundary line as herein last above described has been acquiesced and agreed in and to
by the plaintiff and these defendants and their
predecessors in interest for more than 20 years
next prior to the last date hereinabove named.
that said line has been marked, fixed, defined, and
determined by the building upon said line and a
maintenance thereon of a substantial boundary
line fence which fence as a boundary line has been
acquiesced in and agreed to by the plaintiff and
defendants and their predecessors in interest for
the time hereinabove set out, after evidence by
the fact that the defendants or their predecessors
in interest have permitted old trees to stand along
the boundary line as hereinabove described, to
which old trees there have been attached the wires
completing the fence; which trees today stand
along and mark said boundary line; that defendants or their predecessors in interest, at least 15
years next prior to the date of the trial of this
cause of action, built and constructed a buggy
house and lean-to along said fence line, making
the northerly side of said buggy house and lean-to
part of said fence line ... that plaintiff and his
predecessors in interest have continuously and
uninterruptedly, for a period of more than 20
years next prior to the date last above referred
to, occupied and used their said land up to said
fence and boundary line without molestation or
objection on the pa~t of the defendants, or either
of them or their predecessors in interest; . . .
that said boundary line, as established and fixed
by said fence as herein set out for more than 20
years next prior to the 1st day of May, 1922, has
neYer been disturbed or molested by the defendants or either of them or their predecessors in
interest, but has at all times been acknowledged,
acquiesced in, and mutually agreed to and recognized by plaintiff these defendants, and their
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preth•ec·ssors in inll•rpst as the true ~"'\.ed and ?etermined boundary line behn•Pll thetr n•HJ)('ci t\'e
lands.''
The Court held that the old fence• line under such
circumstances amounted to an agreed boundary line
which the Court was not justified in disturbing.
In connection with the matter of a prior uncertainty
or dispute as to the location of the true boundary line
in connection with establishing a fence as an agreed
boundary line, the Court's attention is directed to
the case of Hannah rs. Pogue, CaL App. 138 P. 2d
790, where an old fence line marking the boundary
between adjoining property owners had existed in a
certain location for more than 20 years prior to the
action arising out of a dispute as to the true line, and
it appearing that there was no direct evidence of any
dispute or uncertainty, the Court holds in the decision
at Page 797 of 138 P. 2d:
''Appellant urges that there is no proof that
there was ever any uncertainty of agreement as
to the location of the true boundary line. Although there is no direct evidence to that effect,
yet the facts found to exist justify the inference
that the previous owners had agreed upon the
location of the boundary line. An agreement fixing a boundary line need not be established by
direct evidence, but may be inferred by conduct,
and especially by long acquiescence. The agreement must be express or implied from the acts
of the parties and acquiesced in for the period
fixed by the statute of limitations. A presumption
that an agreement formerly was made as to the
location of a boundary line may arise from the
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fact that one or hoth of the adjoining owners
have definitely defined such line by erecting a
fence or other monument on it and both have
treated the same as fixing the boundary between
them for such length of time that neither ought
to be denied the correctness of its location. Board
of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App. 102, 201 P.
932.''
The holding of Hannah vs. Pogue (supra) was followed in the later leading case of Board of Trustees of
Leland Sta1zj'ord, Jr., University v. Miller et al., 54 Cal.
App. 102, 201 Pac. 952 (Hearing denied by Supreme
Court), where upon a boundary line contest the lower
court held that an old fence line had been established
by mutual agreement some 660 feet away from the
survey line dividing the properties. The question on
appeal was "whether there is evidence to support the
finding that the predecessors in title of the ·parties
established such boundary line by mutual agreement.
There is no direct evidence of such an agreement, and
the question must, therefore, be determined from the
conduct of the respective owners of the lands, viewed
in the light of the surrounding circumstances.'' The
evidence showed payment of taxes according to the
record title but respect and acquiescence in the fence
as the boundary together with use of the land in the
proprietary sense by the adjoining parties right up to
the fence on each side for more than forty years. In
affirming the lower court the court said at page 953 of
201 Pac.:
''There is no direct evidence to that effect (uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary
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line), but, n~ stated the facts found to t.)x ist justify the inference that the adjoining owner~ had
a·greed upon the }oration of the boundary. rrl~is
inference is of a valid agreement, and necessarily
implies that there was an unt.•ertainty as to the
true line. 'The doctrine of an agreed boundary
line and its binding effects upon the coterminous
owners rests fundamentally upon the fact that
there is, or is believed by all parties to be, an
uncertainty as to the location of the true line ...
This does not mean that the inferenee of an agreement arising from acquiescence does not support
the added inference that the inferred agreement
was based on a questioned boundary. The primary inference is of a valid pre-existing agreement, and to be valid that agreement must have
been based on a doubtful boundary line.' Clapp
v. Churchill, 164 Cal. 745, 130 Pac. 1062."
The matter of determining a boundary by an old
fence line where the old fence may be located apart
from the survey line between adjoining owners is settled
in the leading Utah case of Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah
31, 276 Pac. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1418, et seq. In that case
an old fence was located some distance from the survey
line between adjoining owners, and at the time the
fence was located, both parties knew the fence did not
coincide with the true survey line. There were no permanent improvements of any kind involved, and the
Court held that under those circumstances the old fence
line could not be considered the boundary line between
the parties. The specific issue in the ease is set out at
P. 917 of 276 Pac. as follows:

''It thus becomes of controlling importance to
determine whether two adjacent landowners may
39
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establish a boundary line between their lands by
oral agreement or by acquiescence for a long
period of time, when there is no uncertainty as
to the location of the true boundary line, and
where it is known by them at all times that the
boundary line sought to be established is not the
tr_ue boundary line. . . . Neither are we dealing
with a case where any permanent improvements
have been placed upon the land in reliance upon
an established boundary line.''
The important thing about the opinion is that the court
reiterates and states the supporting rule in many cases
in Utah in connection with establishment of a boundary
by an old fence line, as follows:
''Counsel for defendants cite and rely upon the
rule announced by this court in the following
cases: Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah, 269, 87 P. 1009;
~Loyer v. Langton, 37 Utah, 9, 106 P. 509; Rydalch
v. Anderson, 37 Utah, 99, 107 P. 25; Young Y.
Hyland, 37 Utah 229, 108 P. 1124; Farr Y.
Thomas, 41 Utah 1, 122 P. 906; Binford v. Eccles,
41 Utah 457, 126 P. 333; Christensen v. Beultner,
42 Utah, 392, 131 P. 666; Tanner v. Stratton, 44
Utah 253, 139 P. 940; Warren v. Mazzuchi, 45
Utah 612, 148 P. 360; VanCott v. Casper, 53 Utah
161, 176 P. 849. In these cases the rule is announced and reiterated that, where the owners
of adjoining lands occupy their respective premises up to a certain line which they mutually recognize as the boundcuy line for a long period of
time, they and their grantees may not deny that
the boundary line thus recognized is the true one.
The general rule thus repeatedly enunciated has
beeome the settled law in this jurisdiction. However, the question for determination in this case
is whether the facts here bring it "\vithin the general rule or constitute an exception thereto."
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CONCLUSION
Under the eonclusiYe facts as indieated above by
the evidenee and in accordance with the law eitt>d, it is
respectfully submitted that the distrid court erred, its
decree must be reversed and the defendants and appellants are entitled to a decree and judgment in one or
more respects together with findings and conclusions in
accordance therewith as is indicated below.
1. That plaintiffs are barred by Section 104-2-5,
104-2-6 and/or 104-2-24, Utah Code .Annotated, 1943,
from
a. Instituting or maintaining this action at all, or
b. Bringing or maintaining the action as to any
construction by the defendants with particular reference to five cabins first constructed, renovated, or
completed by defendants on or before 1\iay 6, 1946.
2. Defendants have with their predecessors in title
acquired a perpetual easement to the use of the land
of the plaintiffs which might be found to be encroached
upon.
a. To continue to use the same to the same extent
as such use was continually made beginning in 1912
and continuing thereafter until 1943 and probably
the fall of 1948.
b. To use the same for general proprietory purposes as used since 1911.
41

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3. That the legal boundary Jine between the parties
has been and is now the old fence line location since the
establishment of the same as the boundary between the
parties in 1911 or 1912, and plaintiffs are not entitled to
an injunction requiring defendants to move construction from or pay damages for any land built upon by
defendants southward of the old fence line between the
parties, and plaintiffs are now estopped to claim the
land south of the old fence line.
4. That defendants should in equity be required
in the event of a finding of any encroachment upon the
plaintiffs' land to pay to plaintiffs the market value of
such land encroached upon, and plaintiffs should be
denied an injunction requiring defendants to remove
any of the permanent sewer line and cabin renovation
or construction effected by them.
5. That a ne'v trial should be granted defendants
and appellants.
Respectfully submitted,

PERRY H. BURNHAM,
'VILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.

Received copies of the foregoing brief this 11th
day of December, 1950.

Attorney for the Plainf'iff s
and Responde,nts.
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